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Abstract
Control over means of violence and protection emerge as crucial in much research
on corruption in non-South Asian contexts. In the Indian context, however, we still
know little about the systems of organised violence that sustain the entanglement of
crime, capital and democratic politics. This timely comparative ethnographic piece
explores two different manifestations of what our informants identify as “Mafia Raj”
(“rule bymafia”) across North India (Uttar Pradesh and Punjab). Drawing on analytical
concepts developed in the literature on bossism and “mafias”, we explore protection
and racketeering as central statecraft repertoires of muscular styles of governance
in the region. We show how a predatory economy together with structures of inter-
and intra-party political competition generate the demand for and the imposition of
unofficial and illegal protection and shape different manifestations of Mafia Raj. In
doing so, the paper aims to contribute to debates on the relationship between states
and illegalities in and beyond South Asia.
* Research for this paper has been conducted within the framework of the research pro-
gramme “Democratic Cultures” (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/democratic-cultures), which is cur-
rently exploring the overlap between criminal cultures and politics across India, Bangladesh
and Pakistan (funded by following grants: erc-aimsa/284080 and esrc-es/I036702/1).
Ethnographic data has been collected by direct observation, conversations and interviews
in a provincial town in Western Uttar Pradesh and in Central Punjab during 12 months of
fieldwork betweenMarch 2012 and June 2014. Throughout the text we omitted names and/or
used pseudonymous and obscured localities. The authors share equal responsibility for the
paper and are listed in alphabetical order.
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Introduction
There is no law and order—we live in chaos—in the ‘goonda Raj’ [rule by
gangsters]—but crime is very organised! It is the only organised thing in
Uttar Pradesh.
A joke currently circulating in up
We all want to go abroad because there is no law and order here, every-
thing goes, you can do anything so long as you have the right connections
and money, it is goonda Raj like Bihar under Laloo Yadav Prasad except
that we are more educated than the Biharis.
Quote from a Jat Sikh interviewee
The state of Uttar Pradesh, located in the Hindi heartland, is one of the most
backward in India in terms of socioeconomic conditions. However, since the
late 19th Century, the state has been the nerve centre of Indian politics. Uttar
Pradesh controls one sixth of the Indian Parliament and, therefore, occupies
a central position in the country’s politics. Today, more than 200 million peo-
ple live in the state, a fifth of which are Muslim. The rest are mostly Hindu,
and divided broadly between three mutually antagonistic caste groups: the
upper-caste Brahmins andThakurs; the lower-casteDalits; and the “other back-
ward classes”, such as the Yadavs.Western Uttar Pradesh is widely known for its
endemic violence and criminality (Brass, 1997), for being culturally shaped by
the “macho” ethos of its dominant castes, for being marred by communalism
and caste-based conflicts, and finally by poverty and underdevelopment (Jef-
frey et al., 2014). Besides its national political importance, Uttar Pradesh is the
site where lower castes appear to bemost visibly challenging upper-caste polit-
ical domination.
The Punjab, on the other hand, ranks amongst India’s most developed and
prosperous states. It was one of the first Indian states where the Green Revolu-
tion was implemented, and one of the first in which all villages obtained roads
and electrical connections. With a population of around 27 million—roughly
divided intourbanHindu trading castes, rural Jat Sikhs, and scheduled castes—
the Punjab carries much less weight in Indian national politics than Uttar
Pradesh. Nevertheless the state arguably wields influence far beyond its num-
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bers thanks to a prosperous business community spread across India, Europe
and North America. In 1992, following a decade of violent insurgency and
counter-insurgency inwhich somemilitants fromwithin the state’s Sikhmajor-
ity demanded independence from India, Punjab entered a period of relative
peace in which communal issues receded into the background. Political agen-
das came to be dominated by development and growth. In practice, beyond
the pro-business rhetoric, this move is widely reported to have coincided with
the rise to a tight nexus between business, politics and crime. Despite differ-
ent political histories and distinct socio-economic and religiousmakeups, both
Uttar Pradesh and the Punjab have been described as being under the rule of
gangsters (goondas) and “mafias”.
In this article, we seek to shed more light on the systematic links between
bosses, party machines and “criminals”.1 Crucially, we illustrate key differences
in the way in which protection rackets are organised in these two sites, and
argue that these different forms of organisation reflect different patterns of
Mafia Raj (rule by mafia). We show that the ways racketeers rule within (or in
collaboration with) party machines varies according to local patterns of polit-
ical competition and according to the cultures of violence and discipline of
local party machines. We argue that the consolidation of police power during
Punjab’s brutal counterinsurgency, combined with a disciplined ruling party
machine, have given rise to a more centralised form of racketeering than in
Uttar Pradesh. Moreover, in the post-insurgency period, we find that two-party
competition in Punjab correlates with more muted levels of communal and
caste-based conflict than in Uttar Pradesh, and hence we argue, with less
demand for protection on the basis of communal identities. Western Uttar
Pradesh has what we call a “competitive Mafia Raj” in which a lively multi-
party system combined with the ruling Samajwadi Party’s lack of party disci-
pline produce what is locally perceived as disorder. By contrast Punjab has “a
monopolistic Mafia Raj” in which a two-party system combined with the rul-
ing Shiromani Akali Dal’s tight party discipline produces a sometimes equally
violent but more ordered and authoritarian form of “Mafia Raj”.
Throughout the text we use the popular terms “Mafia Raj” and “Goonda
Raj” (rule by gangsters) as descriptive concepts that articulate particular local
visions of the relations between state, capital, crime and the individual.2 “Mafia
Raj” is a system of political and economic governance in which politics, money
1 Onpartymachine andbossism, see Scott (1969),Migdal (1988); on Italy andRussia, seeChubb
(1996); onEastAsia, see Sidel (1999); on Indonesia, seeWilson (2015); andon India, seeWeiner
(1963).
2 For explorations of the growing nexus between crime and politics in India, see Brass (1997),
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and crime have developed symbiotic relations.3 These “regimes” echo Tilly’s
(1985:169) placement of “banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing, and war-
making on the same continuum”, defining states as “quintessential protec-
tion rackets with the advantage of legitimacy”. Under “Mafia Raj”, mafia-like
bosses claim for themselves the rights to discipline and punish, protect, tax
and represent local populations. More recently, criminologists and sociologists
have emphasised how such “mafias” should be studied as modes of politico-
economic governance, rather than as discrete criminal organisations (see
Varese, 2011; Paoli, 2004). According to the Italian sociologist Armao (2015:3),
when a structured and permanent group of individuals who use violence to
make money through criminal activities meets politics, it gives rise to a third
type of system called “mafia”. Armao has recently conceptualised such mafia-
like systems of governance as “mafia-owned democracies” and placed them
within the globalised patterns of “criminal neoliberalism” that have emerged
since the 1980s. “Mafia-owned democracies” such as both Italy and Mexico,
he argues, are established democracies in which professional gangsters and
their organisations are connected to, and partially control, both political and
economic power. As gangsters further entrench their position, Mafiosi may
increasingly assume both the political leadership and control over the eco-
nomic and financial resources of the state. Formal democracy often fails to
prevent this from happening.
“Mafia-owned-democracies” (and their South Asia manifestations: “Mafia
Raj”) are thus systems of governance where “(even) the official is illegal” and
where nested criminal “official” actors replace the “state” as the privileged part-
ners of capitalism (see Gayer, 2014:39). The term “mafia-owned democracy”
might be applied to a political system as a whole or to sub-systems within it.
It may apply to a particular area or to particular populations, and so we can
have “pockets” of “mafia-owned democracy”. Crucially, such systems of gover-
nance shouldbe seen as effectively “comprehensive andefficientmanifestation
Jaffrelot (2002), Hansen (2001, 2005), Manor (2007), Michelutti (2008), Jeffrey (2010), Vaish-
nav (2011), Berenschot (2011, 2014), Gill (2012), Witsoe (2009), Gooptu (2007) and Sanchez
(2015).
3 The term and concept of “mafia” has been long debated. It has been studied purely as
economic activity and as “enterprise syndicate” (Blok, 1972); “mafia enterprise” (Arlacci, 1993);
and mafia as a protection industry (Gambetta, 1988; Varese, 2001). Tilly (1985) has instead
highlighted the relation between mafia and political sovereignty by introducing the very
interesting notion that organised crime can be compared to both war-making and state-
making (see also Volkov, 2002). See, also Santoro (2011) for a discussion of “Mafia” becoming
a folk concept.
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of modernity, andonepossiblewayof interpretingpolitics in timesof globalisa-
tion” (Armao, 2015:4) and not as exotic oriental exceptions. India is yet another
established democracy in which intense electoral competition combined with
predatory forms of capitalism is producing pockets of “mafia-owned democ-
racy” run and controlled by elected “gangster politicians”.
Across our two sites (but not only in those locations) politics is increas-
ingly seen as the most effective means to improve business opportunities and
prosper.4 Crucially, the transition from business and crime to official politics
has become an obvious career path for many ambitious individuals across
India. Political parties select “criminals” because they can self-finance, and
because they can offer expertise in voter intimidation and violence (Wilkin-
son, 2004;Manor, 2007). According toVaishnav (2011), candidateswith criminal
indictments are twice as likely to win elections if compared with their law-
abiding counterparts. The pioneering work by Barbara Harriss-White (2003:7)
illustrates how systems of “Mafia Raj” “increasingly serve private accumula-
tion: a nexus in which politicians, officials, criminals, and businessmen and
non-matching parenthesis
(their (often poor and dependent) ‘runners’ and fixers are bound together in
a mutually protective embrace.” Unitary state sovereignty, never complete, is
being challenged by the proliferation of private protection services. In a similar
fashion, Alpa Shah (2006) has been drawing attention to “markets of protec-
tion” exploring the continuities between state and “terrorist” and insurgent
groups (in this case, the Maoists in Jharkhand).5 Building on these compar-
ative insights, we use “mafia-owned democracy” as an analytical concept to
compare different manifestations of “Mafia Raj”. Our ethnographic focus is
on what we argue is the central statecraft tool of such of such regimes’ pro-
tection/rackets and explores the unexpected complicities and opportunistic
partnerships that it generates. As Tilly (1985:170–171) famously pointed out,
“Which image the word ‘protection’ brings to mind depends mainly on our
assessment of the reality and externality of the threat. Someone who produces
both the danger and, at a price, the shield against it is a racketeer. Someone
who provides a needed shield but has little control over the danger’s appear-
ance qualifies as a legitimate protector, especially if his price is no higher
than that of his competitors.” Thus, in some cases, protection may be per-
ceived “as socially permitted, encouraged or enjoyed as a moral right or duty”
4 We describe further pockets of ‘Mafia Raj’ across South Asia and the importance of the figure
of the boss as a protector/extortionist in Michelutti et al (n.d).
5 In the context of Africa there is an emerging literature which explores ‘market of protection’
and mafia-like type of sovereignties in conflict zones, see for example Raeymaekers (2010).
For an excellent review of this literature see Hoffman and Kirk (2013).
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(Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois. 2004:5), while in others it may be perceived
as exploitative. The paper shows ethnographically how local party machine
bosses rule (or attempt to rule) over the trade, imposition or even gifts of “pro-
tection”.
“Violent Protectors” and Cultures of Enforcement
In our analysis, we characterise bosses as close to Mafiosi, defined, following
Blok, Sidel and Volkov, as “entrepreneurs who use private, formally unlicensed
violence as a means of social control and economic accumulation”.6 Bosses
“protect” (control and run) neighbourhoods, markets, business groups and
political parties. They are often the source of violence and the provider of
protection from the violence they produce. Crucially, the “Mafia Raj” systems
of governance of which they are part, are linked to an increasingly predatory
and exploitative economy. Our fieldwork was conducted in from one tehsil
in the Punjab and another in Western up.7 In contemporary India, these are
settings where old divides between village and town and rural and urban are
increasingly disappearing. The protagonists of this paper operate across the
rural–urban divide and live in the urbanising mega regions that have emerged
on the North Indian plains. They live in middle India (Harriss-White, 2015), a
place of small towns and peri-urban villages, and booming economies.
Both our settings have undergone tremendous economic changes over the
past 15 years. Crucially, both settings have witnessed a construction boom and
skyrocketing real estate prices, but also the emergence of a variety of new busi-
nesses and industries. In both sites, this has led to an intense scramble for real
estate, but also for opportunities to control booming drug, oil, sand, water and
quarry businesses. It is in this socio-cultural and economic environment that
a number of political bosses—at all levels, from the panchayat through to the
National Assembly—increasingly gain andmaintain their power through their
activities as violent protectors. Protection and extortion are particularly attrac-
tive avenues to power and riches because, as Paoli (2004) argues, they do not
require high initial investments, carry low managing costs, and are relatively
low-risk investments, particularly where state protection is unreliable or inad-
6 Sidel (1999:71–72). In so far as our protagonists overlap with the states they resemble not so
muchHobsbawm’s social bandits, but ratherwhat Blok callsmafia. Blok (1972); Volkov (2002).
7 A tehsil is an administration headquarter located in a town or city and often covers a number
of smaller adjacent towns and villages.
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equate. In a world where money increasingly determines success in life and
becoming rich and becoming rich quickly is the ethos, industries such as extor-
tion become appealing careers paths for working class youth whose manual
and industrial work has been economically and socially devalued by economic
liberalisation (Gooptu, 2007). Extortion provides quick and immediate mone-
tary rewards.8
In the region, the ideal of a strong, “wild” and dangerous boss shapes crim-
inal political cultures. An old repertoire of tropes of honour, kingly leadership
andheroism that valorise “criminal heroes” feed into the valueplacedon tough-
ness andphysical strength. For example, in the area under study enforcement is
one of the constitutive elements used to define the identity of particular social
groups—suchasRajputs,Yadavs and Jats—whodescribe themselves as natural
protectors and use violence and coercion to maintain caste dominance hierar-
chies and enduring patriarchal structures.9 Thakur Dabang and Gurbhachan
Singh, the two main protectors (and aggressors) of our story both belong to
“martial castes”—the first is a Rajput and the second a Jat Sikh—whose cor-
porate identities are often defined by their willingness and ability to use force.
The reputation of members of these castes as protectors and enforcers origi-
nates in their traditional role as rulers and landlords—or as the henchmen of
landlords—who needed martial skills in order to protect their land, enforce
caste hierarchies, and to subjugate but also “protect” labourers (see Breman,
1974), and in the case of the Sikhs, their historically persecuted religiousminor-
ity. This led the British to classify Jats, Rajputs and a variety of different castes,
including the Yadavs, as martial castes. Rajputs and Yadavs inWestern up, and
semi-Rajput castes like Jats in the Punjab, still describe themselves as natural
protectors and as the sole founts of legitimate justice (“We have justice in the
blood,” say the Rajputs in up). They frequently contrast themselves with mem-
bers of the trading and lower castes who they view as timid and weak. Many of
our informants pointed out that young male Rajputs and Jats are hot-headed
and prone to violence. With respect to Rajputs, one informant in up claimed
that, “They do not want to work, even if they don’t have enough land to sus-
tain their families … they still think that their occupation is to go to war, to
fight, to govern or to do sports. Basically, they think that they can earn money
8 For a detail discussion of the impact of “muscular economics” and criminal enterprises on
the production of “Mafia Raj”, see Michelutti et al. (2016).
9 See Michelutti (2014a), who maps out the chains of protection (and violence or threats of
violence) that run through family life (by investigating land grabbing within “the family” and
murders among relatives), village/mohalla life, business and economic activities and “the
political”.
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withoutworking—just bymastering force and intimidation” (Sunita Sisodia, 37
years old, police constable). The same was widely held to be true of the rich Jat
Sikh cultivators who became involved in politics. Thus, in both settings violent
self-driven and profit-driven sovereign acts are embedded in re-casted caste-
based traditions and models of authority. Today, the archetype of the brave,
semi-divine patron is as widespread as ever (Michelutti, 2014b). However, the
rhetoric of virtuous protection often hides a darker reality whereby political
and economic allegiances are sustained through the stick, as much as the car-
rot. In North India, beyond the world of violent political entrepreneurs and
enforcers “the protection offered to your own victims” (Vidal et al., 2003:20)
is also a well-rehearsed mode of gaining control and maintaining obedience
across a variety of sectors of social life. Protection is indeed often a “shadowy
contract” (Strathern, 2012:401) in which violence, personal interests and fan-
tasies of power intersect.
Thankur Dabang and Gurbhachan Singh both derive a significant degree
of their power from membership in large and cohesive dominant sub-castes
that are able to deliver blocks of votes to whatever party they happen to sup-
port. However, their political dominance is no longer based on the traditional
territorial dominance of the type once described by M.N. Srinavas. In rural
areas, dominant landowning castes no longer directly control the livelihoods
of lower-caste labourers because of the growing availability of off-farm work
(see Jodhka, 2014). Nevertheless traditional dominant castes like the Yadavs
and the Jats havemanaged to reproduce their power through politics and state
employment (see Jeffrey, 2001; Breman, 2007). Jats in Punjab became involved
in politics through farmer unions, as well as through the Jat-dominated Shiro-
mani Akali Dal, and Yadavs in up have captured a share of power by uniting
under the banner of the Samajwadi Party (sp). Both groups have also invested
in education in order to obtain jobs in the police, as well as in a variety of dif-
ferent state departments.
“Competitive Mafia Raj”, “Monopolistic Mafia Raj” andMachine
Politics
The ethnography that will follow in the next section illustrates how the open-
ness with which violent protectors can operate, and how they are incorporated
into political parties, relates to structures of inter- and intra-party competi-
tion. In Uttar Pradesh, multi-party competition correlates with higher levels of
communal and caste-based conflict (Wilkinson, 2004) and a higher number of
criminal political candidates (Aidt et al., 2015) and produces a high demand for
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protection services. Moreover the need for muscle-power is at its peak in areas
with deep community divideswhere voters desire forceful representativeswho
can credibly protect their group interests. It has been established that political
parties select criminal candidates in those areas where social divisions are the
most contested (Vaishnav, 2011). The case study of Uttar Pradesh shows how, in
this environment, violent protectors operate in ways that respond to a genuine
demand for protection against real threats.
On the other hand, the Punjab witnessed significant communal violence
during the Khalistani militant period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s,
but stringent counter-insurgencymeasures subsequently rid the state of major
communal tensions. Between 1987 and 1992, the Punjab was under president
rule and became a quasi-militarised “Police Raj” (Singh, 1996:411). By the mid-
1990s Gurharpal Singh (1996:410) wrote that the Punjab provided a model of a
government that had “successfully overcome the most difficult confrontations
since independence”. However, he argues that pacification came at the cost of
the emergence of an authoritarian state that brutalised both society and the
civil administration.
In the post-insurgency period, we find that two-party competition correlates
with more muted levels of communal and caste-based conflict, and hence
we argue, with less demand for communal protection. This is because the
ruling Shiromani Akali Dal in particular has realised that it needs to attract
voters across communal and caste divides if it wishes to obtain a majority
in government (Singh, 2014). In the absence of any significant demand for
protection, we suggest that in the Punjab protection is imposed and signals a
more authoritarian political setup.
Our material also illustrates how intra-party competition, reflected in the
unity or disunity of a political party, affects the degree to which “protector/
enforcers” can operate autonomously. The manner in which party machines
incorporate “criminal elements” affects the capacity of the party to control
and discipline. In the sp, there is a fusion between the party organisation
and its criminal elements; which prevents “the leadership from acting when
some of the troops misbehave” (Verniers, 2014). Moreover Western up’s ruling
Samajwadi Party is loosely organised and its party workers enjoy far more free-
dom than do their counterparts in the Bahujan Samaj Party (bsp) and in the
Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp). Its loose party structure and mercenary ideology
characterised by what Mbembe (1992) calls the “politics of expediency”, com-
binedwith its incorporationof ambitious criminal elements, divides the sp into
a number of competing power centres. This, we suggest, partly accounts for
the anarchy that has characterised the sp’s tenure in government. Following
defeat in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the sp’s leadership recognised that the
2017186 [AJSS-2017-45.6] 005-Martin-Michelutti-proof-01 [version 20170804 date 20170809 16:37] page 701
protection rackets and party machines 701
Asian Journal of Social Science 45 (2017) 692–722
party’s lack of discipline was costing it votes. To remedy this situation Akhilesh
Yadav (the current up chief minister) set up a school to train party cadres
and to improve party discipline.10 However, party workers in both the Bahu-
jan Samaj Party (bsp) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp), which are the other
two main parties in the state, appeared almost envious of the independence
and autonomy of their sp counterparts who were given free reign to get rich
and abuse their power. By contrast, when the bsp was in power (2007–2012),
the “dirty work” was subcontracted to non-party workers. Mayawati (the for-
mer up Chief Minister) didn’t formally incorporate “goondas” into her party
and produce a regime in which “organised” and “centralised” corruption was
visible but controlled.
2 periods replaced by 1, OK?
Mayawati’s elected strongmenwere (and are) not part of
the party organisation and are, hence, highly disposable. In addition, under the
current sp rule, the police (and the dm) is under control of the localMember of
the Legislative Assembly (mla). By contrast, during the bsp’s tenure,Mayawati
kept full control of the state’s administration, in what has been described “a
statist” party (Pai, 2007). Such direct tight control cut across local systems
of bossism and dis-imbedded the bureaucracy from localised patronage rela-
tions.
Similarly, the Punjab’s ruling Shiromani Akali Dal has a highly disciplined
and centralisedpower structure, and the chief minister iswidely held to control
the party with an iron fist. sad party workers closely monitored each other,
sometimes also recording potentially subversive conversations on theirmobile
phones. Moreover, the sad deployed cid plain-clothes police officers to spy on
people to check their political allegiances. Despite recent changes, the party is
still united by religious ideology and by the cause of representing Sikh interests
bothwithin andbeyond the Punjab, and as suchmore closely resembles parties
like the Shiv Sena (Hansen, 2001; Eckert, 2003). Finally, the party did not
fully integrate “criminal” candidates in its party machine, and while it used
henchmen like Gurbhachan Singh (see below), these were easily disciplined
and widely believed to be disposable.
“Competitive Mafia Raj” in a Teshil inWestern Uttar Pradesh
set as heading of first level, correct?
In Uttar Pradesh, the term “Mafia Raj” is particularly associated with the Sama-
jwadi Party, a party oftendescribed as a party of “goondas” (gangsters). It is built
10 See http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/lucknow/post-rout-akhilesh-plans-training
-school-for-party-cadres/ (accessed on 20 April 2016).
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around and draws its support principally from the Yadav community and is led
by Mulayam Singh Yadav, a former wrestler. The Samajwadi Party has a repu-
tation for protecting not only the interests of the Yadavs and Muslims—and
more recently also of Rajputs—but of protecting “criminals”. The extraction
of what is locally termed “goonda tax”—paid in money, votes and favours—in
exchange for protection forms the backbone of the political careers of many
party bosses. If you ask the common man on the street to describe what char-
acterises “Mafia Raj”, he gives a simple and telling answer: “When the sp is in
charge criminals are on the streets, they are able to operate and flourish—the
Samajwadi Party protects ‘them’ and they get revenues from them—it is all
about ‘goonda tax’ (protection money).”
In Western Uttar Pradesh the most powerful violent protectors are referred
to as dabangs, and a number of them began their careers during the previous
Samajwadi Party “Mafia Raj”—between 2002 and 2007. However, many of
them subsequently shifted allegiances because they needed to be with the
party in power in order to obtain the political protection necessary to stay
out of jail. Many dabangs have pending criminal cases against them, and
they need effective contacts in Lucknow (the state capital) to slow down the
court procedures in order to buy time. The term dabang entered the popular
lexicon following the release of two films by that name in 2010 and 2012 and is
now commonly used to refer to mafia-type leaders. Dabangs, unlike ordinary
criminals (goondas), are political leaders and can instill both fear and respect.
As an informant explained: “A Goonda is just a hired thug; to be a dabang
you need to be charismatic, people need to give you influence, you need to
stand out.” Crucially dabangs, or their close relatives, occupy political seats
that afford them both prestige and a degree of state protection. Moreover, a
typical dabang uses his/her own “crew” as bodyguards, travels in white 4×4s
with red beacons and party flags, and flaunts his/her wealth and power with
weapons, ostentatious gold jewellery, and large farmhouses on the outskirts of
town.
However, the principal characteristic of a dabang is that he/she specialises
in racketeering. After land prices skyrocketed over the last 15 years, local vio-
lent political entrepreneurs extended their activities from mainly protecting
traditional illicit activities, such as alcohol production/distribution, drug smug-
gling and contract killing, to dealing in property—increasingly subject to illegal
encroachment by kabza groups—and to real estate development.
To illustrate this, let us take the case of Thakur Dabang, a Rajput who is an
unelected representative of the sp in a Western up constituency where the sp
possesses neither an mp (Member of Parliament), nor an mla (Member of the
Legislative Assembly) seat. His residence is both the Samajwadi Party office
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and the headquarters of his ownprivate “DabangThakur Company”. Local peo-
ple use the terms “company”, “lobby”, “firm” or “mafia racket/cartel” (in Hindi
English) and “parivar” (family) to refer to “organised criminal/political families”
involved in the so-called sand, land, construction, hotel and oil “mafias”.
These are structured and permanent group of individuals who use violence
to make profit through criminal activities and when they meet politics they
become “mafias” (Armao, 2015:3). Thakur Dabang’s Company is effectively the
local representative of an alleged larger, state-wide, Yadav “family firm”, as the
Samajwadi Party is often locally referred to. The terms “firm” and “company”
are revealing because they clearly illustrate how public office and private profit
have become entwined.
In Western up, different segments within the ruling party—in this case the
sp—outsource their business and political operations to companies such as
Thakur Dabang’s, which are often composed of single clans and operate in
a particular territory for varying spans of time. Thakurji possesses the local
franchise of the sp, collecting “protection rents” and sending a cut to the
centre. Crucially, his job as protector is to ensure that the police and the civil
administration do not crack down on illegal businesses and that they facilitate
the operations of legal ones by helping them obtain licences and contracts.
Officials in the civil administration and the police are compelled to cooperate
because, if they do not, they risk being transferred to undesirable posts or even
being suspended. In short, Thakur Dabang sells immunity.
Thakur Dabang is a Rajput and he also belongs to a circuit of protection
linked to Raja Bhaia, the famous Samajwadi Rajput don from central up—
popularly known for feeding his enemies to crocodiles. “d.g.” is the second
key character in the company and is related to the Yadav clan by kinship ties.
The third keymember of the party—who is the current sp district president—
is not from the district, but Delhi. He is a property developer with friendship
and kinship ties to the ruling Yadav clan. “The Company” is widely accused of
making land grabs, and a number of cases involving it have been brought to
the attention of the local press and police. However, the police have taken no
action against members of the company.
Take, for example, the case of Mr. S. Sharma—a retired teacher—whose
house was forcibly occupied by a notorious local sp party aide. Mr. Sharma
managed to file an fir against the sp leader, but the police failed to take action
and track down the accused. In the meantime, Mr. Sharma’s family received
numerous threats from sp workers and lived, in his own words, “in absolute
terror” for over two months. His ordeal only ended when he dropped the
charges after sp workers threatened to kidnap his child. However, he lost his
property.
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It is also an open secret that a number of sp municipality ward represen-
tatives are grabbingmunicipal land. The townmayor told us several times
that she can do nothing about it because she does not have the support of
the police and administration. As an old sp party worker said, “Akhilesh
Yadav took charge as chief minister on the 15March 2012 in the afternoon,
and by dinner time local sp party workers were already grabbing land and
properties …”
p. yadav, sp party worker
While the sp cannot win a Lok Sabha seat in the constituency, its solidmajority
at state level means that its “contractors” in town are nevertheless in charge
and have the power to protect illegal activities and collect protection rents.
Regarding the “bhumi mafia”, a member of the Thukar Dabang company had
the following to say: “You knowhow it is done, Luciaji. It’s very easy. Youmuscle
up or pay a couple of people at the Nagar Palika office, beat up or kill the local
Bhaia who thinks he deserves a share of the profits … then the land is all yours,
it isn’t municipal land anymore, very easy. The most important thing for us
(Indians) is land. People die for Land.”
The party also allegedly collects rents by helping supporters with disputes,
police and court cases, and arranging bureaucratic transfers. As in the
Punjab—see below—influence over the police is crucial in these everyday
mediations in which people want police cases against them withdrawn, or in
which they want to frame fake criminal charges against enemies. To secure its
local influence over the police, the sp transferred all uncooperative superin-
tendents of police out of the district. Over the past three years, eight super-
intendents of police have been transferred from the district. Equally revealing
of sp control over the police is the fact that most shos at local police stations
are members of the Yadav caste. To sum up, therefore, Thakur Dabang works
not only with the direct protection and involvement of “the Yadav Company”,
but it also works with the support of the police and of an equally politicised
district administration.11 In short, state officials sell protection just as much as
criminals do.
However, Thakur Dabang Company does not have the monopoly over pro-
tection in the tehsil. He faces competition fromother companieswhose leaders
have the backing of other sp patrons, as well as from emerging patrons in the
11 A parallel story of transfers and promotions is also present at the dm (District Magistrate
Office) level. There have been seven dms in the tehsil over the past two years. The patwari
is also a key figure that “the company” needs to have on board for registering grabbed land.
He is a Yadav, too.
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bjp camp. One of the problems at the heart of the present “Uttar PradeshMafia
Raj” is its instability due to the availability of multiple andoften competing cen-
tres of protectionwithin the sp. As one informant pointed outwhen comment-
ing on the difference between the previous bsp regimeunder the chief minister
Mayawati (a now famous Dalit leader) and the current sp regime: “You see …
Mayawati was alone—she has no family, no sons or daughters, no uncles! And
she just took themoney for herself and to build statues, but there are at least 20
relatives in Mulayam’s family who occupy elected state and national assembly
seats—and hundreds of them at the local level, all of whom feel entitled to loot
the state for as long as the sp stays in power” (Rattan Singh, 35 years old, milk
seller). In fact, popular belief has it that up is run by four-and-a-half chief min-
isters: Mulayam Singh Yadav (Akhilesh’s father), Ram Gopal Yadav and Shivpal
Singh Yadav (Akhilesh’ s uncles), Azam Khan, and Akhilesh is the half.
There are at least four factions in the party in the district. There are six
vice presidents and we counted at least ten city presidents (or former city
presidents) in the month of April 2014. It is, in fact, very difficult to figure out
who yields influence locally within the sp organisation as internal fights lead to
frequent reconfigurations of power. There are few people in the town/district
who can claim to be the “real” representatives of the “Yadav parivar”.
Information about who has the leadership’s favour is carefully distributed,
or completely lacking. There are, for example, a number of local leaders who
only came to know that they had been expelled from the sp through Face-
book rumours. They never received confirmation of this from any member of
Mulayam’s family and were kept in the dark about their fate for indefinite peri-
ods of time. These rumours, however, had the effect of discrediting them as
leaders and protectors. Given that information has the potential to undermine
a leader’s effectiveness, control over it is a prerequisite for power. Overall com-
peting power centres and a lack of information create a great deal of insecurity
and an absence of trust among the members of the public who often do not
know where to go for protection. As Gambetta (1993) argues, lack of trust in a
context where the state is unable to provide basic security generates the popu-
lar demand for Mafia-like protection.
Spending time at Thakur Dabang’s office provided insights into routine
forms of intimidation, and to catch glimpses of how leaders sought to orches-
trate riots and planned retaliations and assaults against enemies. The following
describes some of the events witnessed at Thakur Dabang Company’s office
one morning during a routine “Darbar” (public “court” meeting). While we
waited in the office a petitioner from the local neighbourhood arrived.He had a
problem with property borders. Satish Yadav (Thakur Dabang’s aide) gave him
the telephone number of a person who could help him. Then he said, “Go kick
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him badly (eklat marla) and then tell him to call me.” The man said, “Yes—I
shall do it … but can I also have some Samajwadi Party’s headed paper?” Peo-
ple often ask for sp headed paper because it is believed to give credibility. If you
have sp headed paper it means that you are closer to the “circuit of protection”
and your threat of violence gains more credibility.
At this point another wealthy and upper-caste looking “client” arrived and
began to talk about his problem immediately and without introduction. He
wanted to avoid criminal charges—for a crime whose nature was not specified
at the time—and came to complain about how the police officer in charge of
the investigation wanted more than the Rs 50,000 he had previously agreed to
take in order to get him off the hook. Thakur Dabang said, “How is it possible
that that police officer is daring to ask you so for much money?” At that point,
a pujari who was in the room distributing Prasad to people in there said, “If
the police officer does not do what you asked, break his bones! (sarle ka taung
tod dena).” Thakur Dabang responded gravely that there would be no need for
violence.He said, “Justmentionmyname. Itwill be enough.”And then repeated
it, “Just give my name.”
What we describe above illustrates how politicians routinely undermine
the rule of law. Party bosses protected people involved in both legal and ille-
gal activities, a practice interchangeably referred to as “sewa” (social work) or
“goondagardi” (criminal work). The sp party name and its “goonda” credentials
are consistently used to extort favours. Sometimesmerely having aYadav name
or dropping the name of a particular leader lends credibility to an act of intimi-
dation. Importantly, an enforcer canmerely issue threats without having to act
upon them. As Bola Bhaia (the neighbourhood local dabang) told me, “After
all it is not what you do and how criminal and violent you are. What counts is
what people believe you are capable of protecting. It is people who make you
a dabang not the other way around.” Later that same day in Thakur Dabang’s
headquarters some party workers came to ask Thakur Dabang whether they
should intensify their election campaign in X Tehsil. Oddly enough Thakur
Dabang told them not to, and the party workers looked puzzled given that only
a fewweeks remained until polling.Why Thakur Dabang was not campaigning
only became clear to me a couple of weeks later when someone at the com-
pany toldme it was no use spendingmoney on electionswhen your party stood
no chance of winning. He said, “You keep the money allocated for the election
campaign andyoumakemoremoneyby selling votes fromyourprotected areas
to the two main contending candidates. This is a business strategy. Since last
August after the riots it was clear that bjp was taking over up.”
Others have alleged that Thakur Dabang was already moving his own com-
pany under the protection of the bjp (he used to be with the bjp, although
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actually he has moved across all available parties over the past 20 years). The
dabangs’ relation with “the Yadav Parivar” is volatile and their loyalty unpre-
dictable, particularly when approaching elections herald a shift in power at
the provincial level. At such moments, dabangs will often deliver votes from
their protected areas to whatever party they believe might come to power. In
order to do this, they both threaten and cajole voters and bribe and intimidate
booth-level and police officers in order to try and rig elections. This is particu-
larly true of village council (panchayat), block samiti12 andmunicipal elections
during which the highly politicised provincial administration runs elections.
Dabangs keep votes captive through local vote contractors, musclemenwho
are often village councillors (sarpanch) or municipal councillors in town and
who have detailed knowledge of voting patterns at their local polling booths.
Importantly the “vote contractors” oftenwield authority in Khap Panchayats—
informal bodies that adjudicate caste disputes13—and use the threat of ostra-
cism to ensure that people vote according to their dictates. We have been told
that this threat is even more effective than that of physical punishment. As
in the Punjab (see below), vote contractors can find out who people voted
for through rumours and by analysing booth-wise polling results. This leads to
what Stokes (2005:315) calls perverse accountability, a phenomenon whereby
voters can be held accountable and punished for voting for the “wrong” party.14
Moreover, contractors who fail to deliver are themselves often punished. In
the previous district council (Zila Parishad) elections, wemet a contractorwho
had failed to deliver and was, as a consequence, beaten up so badly that he was
hospitalised and had to walk with crutches for months thereafter. On another
occasion, while we waited to meet a local dabang, we saw party workers plan-
ning an attack on a vote contractor who was flirting with two political parties
at the same time. Subsequently, the man and three of his aides ended up hos-
pitalised. This shows again how the relation between political bosses and their
musclemen is not straightforward (cf. Gayer, 2014) in a competitive environ-
ment and does not follow conventional, more stable forms of patron–client
relations.
12 The block samiti is the level above the village council and below district level, and a block
is usually comprised of a number of villages.
13 Informal caste panchayats are to be distinguished from formal panchayats, which are a
formal part of the Indian state.
14 Anna Hazare’s anti-corruption movement has been campaigning to eliminate results by
polling booth but political parties have opposed it, presumably because it does away with
an important mechanism through which they can monitor voters.
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“Monopolistic Mafia Raj” in a Tehsil in the Punjab
The Punjabi context presents some stark contrasts with that of up. Here, the
number of mlas with criminal records is 17% instead of 35%.15 Moreover,
among those mlas with criminal records only 4% have serious pending crim-
inal cases, as opposed to 19% in up. It is only recently, long after the term
gained currency in Bihar and up, that the term “Mafia Raj” has become com-
mon in Punjabi media. The “Mafia Raj” in the Punjab bears the mark of the
authoritarian police state that emerged from the counter-insurgency period
and lacks the more fragmented and dispersed attributes that characterise it
in Uttar Pradesh. However, “Mafia Raj” in the Punjab is also closely associated
with the Indian real estate boom. Moreover, the term “Mafia Raj” also appears
to stick to one party in particular: The sad, a party that much like the sp is
dominated by a ‘martial’ community, the Jat Sikhs. Jat Sikh nationalists fre-
quently claim that while the party was once ideologically driven and devoted
to the cause of Punjabi nationalism and the defence of the Sikh faith, it has
now become a mercenary party whose leaders are mainly concerned with the
expansion of their private businesses. Recently, both vernacular and English-
language papers have described the “mafianisation” of Punjabi politics, but few
scholars—with thenotable exceptionof S.S.Gill (2013)—havepaid any system-
atic attention to the issue.
The 2014 victory of four candidates from the Aam Admi Party (Common
Man Party)—a party with a strong anti-corruption agenda—in the Malwa
region was widely seen as an indictment of Akali “Mafia Raj”, racketeering,
high-handedness and general arrogance. The press identified Akali protection
of and involvement in the state’s flourishing drug trade, the artificially-created
shortage of sand by a politically-connected “sand-mafia”, and the corruption
and politicisation of the police—as well as of the broader administration—
as the principal causes of popular discontent. The latter was of particular
concern ever since the ruling party placed local police station heads (shos)
under the direct control of mlas. Also affecting the party’s popularity were
the widespread allegations that the party leadership have forcefully acquired
shares in a number of businesses in the state, ranging from media outlets to
roadside dhabas (restaurants), and bus services to commercial property and
industry. Businessmen who refuse to pay tribute to the party leadership and
likewise refuse to pledge their political allegiance to it soon face bureaucratic
15 See http://adrindia.org/sites/default/files/Combined%20MLAs.pdf.
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hurdles that cause their businesses to shut down, and the police allegedly
harass transporters whose business competes with that of the chief minister’s
family. Here, too, we find that state officials are using their position to extort
“protection” money from people. People who refuse to pay tribute find them-
selves harassed by the bureaucracy and by the police, and in some cases even
physically intimidated by thugs, as in Western up. A single family dominates
the sad, rather than a large extended clan, as in the case of the sp, and the
reigns of power are clearly held in the hands of the chief minister, who runs a
disciplined party machine (see Singh, 2013) manned by an army of party work-
ers. While unlike in Uttar Pradesh politicians are not necessarily individuals
with criminal records, the party does protect goondas. However, sad rule in
the Punjab resembles the previous rule of the Bahujan Samaj Party and of the
Bharatiya Janata Party in Uttar Pradesh more closely than it does sp’s rule in
that it firmly controls its goondas and partyworkers.Moreover the sad appears
to be more cohesive than the sp because it mobilises both party workers and
voters on the basis of religious ideology.While Pritam Singh (2014) has recently
noted that the sad has shifted its discourse towards development and away
from divisive communal issues in order to lure predominantly urban Hindu
voters, it is still common to hear lower-ranking party workers reminding their
Jat Sikh constituents of the sacrilege committed against the Golden Temple
by the Congress Party under Indira Gandhi. This emotive issue gains the sup-
port of a number of Jat Sikhs, particularly among an older generation who
often claim that they will vote for the sad regardless of its performance for the
sake of the Sikh faith and to oppose the Congress party. Further, while Akali
party workers also sometimes shift their political allegiances, they seem less
likely to do so than their Samajwadi Party counterparts because the Akalis are
believed to punish defectors by harassing them and embroiling them in fake
police charges.
Overall, our material indicates that political loyalties are clearer than in
WesternUttar Pradesh. InTehsil x, unlike inWesternup, everyoneknowswhere
the power really lies. The local mla and cabinet minister, a man of immense
wealthwith family andbusiness ties inNorthAmerica anda family friendof the
chief minister, is clearly in charge. People flock to his palatial home—stocked
with a retinue of Mercedes cars and 4×4s—in order to attend daily court
sessions over which he presides like a deity with the power to miraculously
resolve seemingly intractable problems with a single phone call. Surrounded
by two personal assistants and several heavily armed policemen, he calls land
record officers, policemen, electricity board officers and government doctors.
Among other things, people obtain jobs, cripples obtain wheelchairs, school
fees are waived, and police investigations are influenced in their favour. The
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minister works indefatigably to resolve people’s minutest problems. Whatever
its failures, the local Akali leadership cannot be accused of being absent and
not working for its supporters. In fact, the local minister appears omnipresent,
an appearance clearly reinforced by the fact that framed pictures of him adorn
the walls of all his party workers.
The party can, however, be accused of extreme partiality towards its sup-
porters and of victimising its opponents. Anyone who needs administrative or
police help is expected to support the sad and to do so publicly by swearing
their allegiance in Sikh temples (Gurudwara) andHindu temples.While, unlike
in the case of the sp workers described above, the mla does not threaten his
own supporters and the atmosphere at his headquarters is generally convivial,
he does threatenopponents and even commandspartyworkers to thrash them.
Whilewenever saw this in person, people showedus videos of him issuing such
commands on their mobile phones, and several Congressmen told us that he
had ordered party workers to attack them.
He forced several Hindu brick-kiln owners in the tehsil headquarters of x to
join the Akalis by threatening them with police and bureaucratic harassment
for illegally using tractors to transport their bricks. Akali brick-kiln owners
who transported their bricks just as illegally had nothing to worry about; they
were protected, just as a number of party workers involved in the lucrative
illegal trade in opiates were. We were also told that having been forced to join
the party, they were subsequently expected to provide it with funds in the
form of donations to the local mla. In rural areas, where Akalis dominated,
wealthy Congressite Jats who controlled vote banks and who owned shellers
(for husking and cleaning paddy) risked having their licences revoked, or, as
we observed in one instance, not being allotted their due share of paddy for
processing. These were all clear-cut cases of racketeering in which protection
was granted in exchange for political loyalty and money.
The fact that the Akali government had given local politicians control over
the local shomade it easier thanever for partyworkers to intimidate voters and
to file spurious firs against rivals and those who supported them. Through-
out the countryside, Akali village councillors used their power to victimise
opponents, filing fabricated or specious charges against village rivals; charges
included illegally encroaching on village common spaces and lands, binding
labourers through debt, committing an offence under the India Atrocities Act
against a member of the Scheduled Castes, and even rape. Most frequently
sarpanches used their power to secure control over grant money and village
common lands and deny their opponents access to these. In a number of cases,
they were also instrumental in rigging panchayat and block samiti elections
with the collusion of the police.
2017186 [AJSS-2017-45.6] 005-Martin-Michelutti-proof-01 [version 20170804 date 20170809 16:37] page 711
protection rackets and party machines 711
Asian Journal of Social Science 45 (2017) 692–722
As elsewhere throughout the Punjab, it was a Youth Akal Dal leader who led
the party’s shock troops in Tehsil x. The localminister used him to organise ral-
lies, rig local elections, and thrash rivals and, in exchange, shielded him from
thepolice and allowedhim to forcefully grab disputedproperties, run gambling
dens, traffic drugs, and forcefully settle personal scores.While Gurbachan him-
self was protected, he too sold protection services to people whose properties
were disputed, but hewas known tohave turned against someof thosewhohad
hired him. One widow hired him to protect her against family members who
were trying to get control over her property. Gurbachan managed to scare off
the relatives, but subsequently turned on the widow and threatened her into
signing her most valuable residential property over to him.
Lawyers in the divisional courts told us that despite his crimes, Gurbachan
Singh had no pending cases against him. However, they also indicated that
he was only able to act thanks to the support of the local mla, and that the
day the mla decided that he was too much of a liability he would probably
land in jail as other Youth Akali Dal toughs had in the past. Since he depended
on the mla’s support, Gurbachan could not do whatever he pleased and had
already been significantly reigned in by 2013. Prior to this, he was known to
have randomly beaten up people in the streets for the mere fact of daring to
look at him. However, the mla only reined him in after Hindu traders came
to complain about how Gurbachan had threatened one of them at gunpoint
because of a relatively minor argument.
In our Punjab tehsil then, goondas were more clearly controlled than their
counterparts in Western up. Moreover, unlike in up where it was not clear
which goonda had party support, people knew exactly who had party support
and who did not. It was well known that Gurbachan was the main goonda
in Tehsil x. Unlike the dabangs in Uttar Pradesh, however, no-one thought it
likely that he would ever become an mla or an mp. Media attention on crime
and corruption meant that Akali politicians needed to appear clean and a
tainted record was a liability. Further, perhaps the predominance of wealthy
established Jats with family ties and business interests abroad within the party
meant that, unlike inUttar Pradesh,wheremembers of lower and intermediate
castes had risen to power, more genteel forms of respectability held sway.
The brother of the local mla was, for example, repeatedly refused a party
ticket because of his bad reputation as the patron of local toughs. While the
party clearly needed him and allowed him to wield power unofficially, they did
not want him in the limelight. For the most part, the party sought to keep its
criminal activities hidden and used people without official positions—like the
local mla’s younger brother—or lower-ranking workers like Gurbachan to do
its dirty work.
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Gurbachan Singh was a Jat Sikh from a village a couple of miles from x
and had caught the local mla’s attention because he belonged to a large and
politically active extended kinship group of Akali “refugees”—Jat Sikhs who
migrated from West Punjab at Partition—and because of his forceful reputa-
tion and willingness to do the party’s dirty work. The extended kinship group,
united through ties of descent and affinity, included block samitimembers and
ex-chairmen, market committee members, co-operative society presidents,
sarpanches, Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandak Committee (sgpc)16 members,
and, crucially, the personal assistant of the local mla. The latter was the son of
a powerful party worker who was widely known for protecting drug traffickers
and distillers from the police in exchange for votes, and occasionally formoney.
United, this large group was able to deliver a large number of votes to the local
mla and received significant political patronage in exchange.
As in Western Uttar Pradesh kinship was clearly central to political mobili-
sation and organisation. However, unlike in Western Uttar Pradesh where the
term “company” showed how public and private interests were openlymerged,
the refugees merely referred to themselves as a “group” and described them-
selves as public servants (sevadars). This indicates that corruption and crime
could not be flaunted as openly as they were in Western Uttar Pradesh. Dis-
plays of force were also somewhat more muted than in Uttar Pradesh, and
when party workers like Gurbachan overdid things they were reigned in. On
the other hand, party workers did flaunt their influence, contacts and wealth
as these allowed them to be perceived as effective politicians and thereby gar-
ner votes. Poor politicians lacking these assets were widely perceived as unable
to do people’s work (logon ka kaam).
Gurbachan Singh started his political career during his college dayswhen he
was a kabaddi player. During those days he proved his worth in several fights
against rival student groups and eventually defeated rival contenders to stu-
dent union leadership. People who knew him from his college days told me
he was always getting into fights. However, the feat that permanently estab-
lished him as the biggest goonda in x was his capture and subsequent sale of
the abovementioned widow’s urban property. Like the dabangs inWestern up,
Gurbachanwas involved in property dealing and specialised not only in selling
protection to people whose properties were disputed, but also in the sale and
purchase of disputed properties. Most commonly disputes arise when a tenant
whohas possession over a property refuses to pay rent and/or vacate it. Because
of laws protecting tenants, it is difficult—and in some cases even impossible—
16 The sgpc manages Sikh Gurudwaras and its their significant revenues.
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to evict them. People like Gurbachan help people evict and threaten wayward
tenants for a fee, but also help prevent the illegal encroachment of people’s
property. Additionally, property speculators like Gurbachan also buy disputed
properties for a third of their value, sort out the dispute with money and/or
force, and then sell them off for their full value.
While Gurbachan’s notorious feats were widely discussed, other Akali party
workers, including close relatives of his, alsoused their influence to take control
of communal property both in town and in the villages. Upon gaining office
the mayor of x sold significant amounts of urban property to associates in the
sad,17 and allowed some of Gurbachan’s relatives to grab some shops in the
centre of town where they set up fertiliser and commission agent businesses.
In villages, wheremost of the fieldworkwas conducted, themost common land
grab was of village commons (shamlaat zameen), which like all other land had
become a coveted asset.
Gurbachan’s ties with the authorities and his role as a “vote contractor”
became clear whenwe sawhim and several youngmen—mostly relatives from
his own village and neighbouring ones—capturing the polling station in his
home village of Mial Khurd during the block samiti elections of 2013. The
event and what happened subsequently clearly illustrate how the Akalis could
forcefully extract tribute in the form of votes and how they unleashed the full
force of the state against those who refused to pay it. On that day Gurbachan
and his men had denied the opposition Congressites entry into the polling
station, andwhen I reached the village the latter were amassed a hundred or so
metres away from it shouting “Death to the Akali Dal!” (Akali Dal Murdabad).
Inside the polling station, Gurbachan and his brothers were feeding the polling
officers large plates of rich food—flat-breads soaked in clarified butter, an
assortment of curried vegetables and lentils, pickles and large metal tumblers
filled with cool yoghurt drink (lassi). The previous night I had seenmembers of
Gurbachan’s extended family offering polling officers and policemen bottles of
whisky at three polling stations. The officers had accepted, although some had
at first weakly refused in order not to look greedy.
Just after the officers had eaten, the Congressites decided to take on the
Akalis. The latter, who were more numerous and had swords and metal rods
ready at hand, got the upper hand and beat the Congressites so badly that
17 OppositionCongress town councillors toldme that by doing this themayor had effectively
deprived the town of an important source of income. Prior to this, the municipal council
had an income of some 70 lakhs, whereas it currently has an income of only 40 lakhs,
which is not enough to cover the 65 lakhs required annually to even meet the costs of
running the municipality.
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they sent two of them to hospital. The ten or so police officers present at the
polling stationdidnothing to stop them.Thatnight ptcnews channel—owned
by the chief minister’s family—broadcast Gurbachan’s version of events and
claimed that theCongressites had tried to disrupt otherwise peaceful elections.
The local Congress leader, Sukhvinder Singh, claimed to have called several
reporters but that none had wanted to report on actual events because they
were scared of retribution by the ruling party. He claimed that in most cases
people did not even bother to contact reporters because they were either
ignorant, or too scared to antagonise the Akalis, or simply because they had
no faith in reporters who were believed to be in the pay of politicians or, in the
best of cases, took money to write stories.18
Worse still, the Akalis placed charges for attempted murder against him
and 11 Congressites, including those who had been hospitalised. Gurbachan
used these to force the Congress leaders to step down in the forthcoming
panchayat elections and allow him to become village sarpanch unopposed,
without having to actually contest the elections. Sukhvinder Singh—who had
close tieswith the PunjabCongress leadership andwaswell informed about his
party’s standing—lamented how somanymembers of his party were stepping
down and allowing Akalis to take over because they were afraid.
What happened to him and his close associates illustrates the fate of those
who did not step down. When the Akalis had come to power for a second
consecutive term, Gurbachan Singh had decided to teach Sukhvinder and his
family a lesson. Gurbachan and his family were irked by Sukhvinder’s political
influence, and by the fact that it had made him Block Samiti Chairman during
the last Congress government. They were also jealous about the fact that he
had greatly prospered over the years by transforming 40 acres of jungle into
fertile irrigated land. Sukhvinder’s son told me they hated the fact that his
father had been the first to build a large new house, and that he had been sent
to an exclusive, elite school in Nabha. He claimed that Gurbachan’s family—
which he described as a bunch of illiterates (unparh log)—were constantly
using black magic against him, and he alleged that Gurbachan had tried to
destroy his family by getting his younger brother addicted to heroin.While not
wanting to show that Gurbachan had in any way been successful, he admitted
that the younger brother’s drug addiction was a constant source of tension in
the family. The brother did not work, spent lots of money on his addiction, and
constantly fought with him and his parents.
18 While both the Punjabi- and English-language press underreported the extent of rigging,
they did nevertheless report several cases.
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Animosities reached a peak after the Akalis returned to power in 2012. One
day, while the chairman’s son was out in the fields supervising his labourers,
12 young men armed with iron rods and rifles assaulted him. His father, who
was at home, sawwhatwas happening, took out his rifle, and fired several shots
into the air. Upon hearing the shots the attackers all ran away and subsequently
went on to the police station to file charges for attempted murder against him
and his father. Because the case against them was registered in the evening
they were unable to obtain bail and had to spend one night in jail. Moreover
the police, serving the interests of the Akalis, refused to register the chairman’s
case against the attackers. Fortunately, the sub-divisional judge rejected the
Akali case and all charges were dropped. The chairman told us that while
the judiciary was corrupt and inefficient it remained a largely independent
institution, unlike the police.
Sukhvinder boasted that most other Congress party workers were not as
fearless as he was. In another nearby village, Gurbachan had threatened an
sc Congress candidate for the block samiti elections, telling him that if he
did any campaigning he would beat him up. Like other Congress candidates
throughout the Punjab, he had bowed down to the pressure although he had
not shifted his allegiance over to the Akalis, unlike his associates who had
been asked to pledge their allegiance to the party in the village Gurudwara.
Like in other villages we visited, they had shifted over because they feared
having fake police charges placed against them if they did not. Their fear
was well founded, since one Congressman in their village had been falsely
implicated in a rape case, and in another village a Ramdasia sc told me that he
had been falsely implicated in a village brawl where he was not even present
because he had refused to pledge his allegiance to the Akalis in the village the
Gurudwara. In this latter village, theAkalis hadmade sc access to housing plots
contingent upon them swearing allegiance to the party, and to the sarpanch
who represented it locally. Those who did not do this were denied housing
plots, and those who led them—like the above sc—were implicated in fake
police charges.
Gurbachan and his allies also appear to have managed to get the police to
rig panchayat elections for them in Mial Kalan Khurd (a twin village next to
Mial Khurd). TheCongress chairman toldme that in this case the police did the
rigging, rather thanGurbachanandhis toughs, becausehis faction in the village
was themore numerous one andwould have beendifficult to overcome. In fact,
members of the chairman’s faction all claim that their candidate obtained 309
votes, while the Akali candidate only obtained 70. However, the mla’s younger
brother had promised to hand the village council over to the latter by hook
or by crook, so he sent in the police and ensured his win. The Congressites’
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claim that their party had a strong lead is vindicated by the fact that four out
of five council members (panches) elected in the village were from their party;
this vindicates their claim because no-one votes for panches from one party
and for a sarpanch from another. In other words the Congress’ four panches are
evidence that the Congress candidate for sarpanch did, in fact, have the lead.
Subsequently, while the Akali candidate did not obtain the quorum necessary
to run thepanchayat, it nevertheless appears that the localmla gavehimgrants
for village development. The chairman is nevertheless confident that as a result
of the blatant rigging that took place in the village even loyal Akalis would
reconsider their allegiance to the party.
Conclusions
While close ties between the political, business and criminal spheres are by no
means new to India—nor to the rest of the world—our informants across the
Punjab and Uttar Pradesh agree that these spheres are becoming increasingly
intertwined and forming “Mafia Raj”. Scholarly work on Indian politics likewise
indicates that this is the case. In thePunjabi context, S.S. Gill (2014) has recently
argued that business and politics are nowmore closely tied than they ever have
been, while Jaffrelot and Kumar’s (2009) longitudinal study of mla profiles has
demonstrated similar trends in the context of Uttar Pradesh. Both government
officials and strongmen are providing illegal protection services and are doing
so in response to a growing demand for protection produced by a violent
scramble for valued economic assets.
In theory at least, the illegal market for protection is the preserve of groups
operating on the margins or outside the state, while the legal market for pro-
tection is meant to be the preserve and monopoly of sovereign states. This
paper shows how in two sites across North India this distinction collapsed, and
illustrates how formal state agents, including elected and non-elected political
leaders and the police, are increasingly involved, either directly or indirectly, in
protecting illegal activities. At first glance the distinction appears to be more
blurred in Western Uttar Pradesh where the Samajwadi Party openly admits
bosses with “criminal” backgrounds than in the Punjab where the Shiromani
Akali Dal subcontracts “goondagardi” (criminal work) to lower ranking party
workers. However, a focus on “protection/extortion” makes it clear that both
the sad and the sp developed symbiotic relations with the state in order to run
their economic and political activities (both the legal and the illegal ones). The
nature of the partymachines in question, and their capacity tomonopolise vio-
lence shape “various types of interaction between political actors and violent
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entrepreneurs as well as various modes of penetration of organised criminal
violence within the political arena ….
replace 4 periods by 3?
”19 Indeed, they produced different con-
figurations of “mafia-owned democracy”: a “competitive Mafia Raj” inWestern
Uttar Pradesh and “monopolistic Mafia Raj” in Punjab.20
The difference is that in the Punjab leaders can somewhat more credibly
distance themselves from the henchmen within their parties’ ranks. This is a
useful reminder that illegal and para-legal activities in India are not the sole
preserve of local vernacular forces, and also allows us to move away from
narratives according to which criminal politics is the preserve of India’s more
overtly lawless and backwards districts, or of the vernacular forces of political
society (Chatterjee, 2004).
We have also suggested that structures of inter- and intra-party competi-
tion can help explain how the demand and the imposition for protection are
structured.We saw how, inWestern Uttar Pradesh, multi-party competition—
coinciding with communal and caste-based divides—contributed to produce
highly violent forms of bossism and volatile environments. Intra-party compe-
tition arising from the sp’s loose party structure and its integration of muscular
bosses within the party’s ranks further generated popular demand for pro-
tection by giving rise to insecurity. Furthermore, competing strongmen, both
across parties and within the sp, vying for control over protection mean that
people in Western up are not only subject to the predatory activities of var-
ious contending bosses, but are also unable to determine who they need to
approach if they need mediation with the authorities. As one informant said,
“Nowadays people don’t know whom they have to pay or whom they have to
beat up in order to get things done: this is the Junglee Raj” (Rakesh, 35 years old,
Jat, businessman). Revealingly, people do not criticise dabangs for being crim-
inal and violent, but for the fact that they are unable to effectively provide the
basic security that rulers are expected to. It is perhapsworth remembering here
that a key duty of traditional kings is to maintain order (dharma) through the
threat of violence and punishment (danditi). The king should inspire terror in
order to deter disruptive forces and thereby allow his subjects to live peacefully
and to practice ahimsa. However, as is often repeated in Western up, “People
have no fear.” This is what we choose to call a “competitive Mafia Raj”.
19 Briquet and Fararel-Garrigues (2010:2).
20 In a similar fashion Armao characterises Italy as a consociational “mafia-owned democ-
racy”: a regime based on cooperation between mafiosi, politicians and entrepreneurs.
By contrast Mexican democracy is conceptualised as centrifugal “mafia-owned democ-
racy” and characterised by strongly competitive behaviours between the various leaders
involved and a much greater degree of violence compared to the Italian situation.
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On the other hand, in the Punjabi tehsil of x, the sense of insecurity is less
pronounced because communal tensions within the Punjab have subsided,
and electoral competition is largely restricted to two dominant parties that are
increasingly reaching across communal and caste divides. It is also less pro-
nounced because the sad leadership is firmly in control of its operatives, and
for the most part the only goondas allowed to operate are the ones that clearly
serve its interests. Additionally, the activities of these goondas are set within
strict limits and when they overstep these they are reigned in—as Gurbachan
was following the incident in which he threatened a goldsmith at gunpoint.
Furthermore, people knowexactlywhere to go if theyneedassistance for police
or bureaucratic matters. Here, the main victims of insecurity are members of
the opposition and—like everywhere else in the world—the poor who lack
political contacts and influence. Thus, in the Punjab, the only significant threat
to citizens is the one produced by the ruling party, which happens to also pro-
vide the shield against this threat to those who pledge their loyalty and provide
it with funds. Here, people do not complain so much about disorder as they
do about dictatorship and frequently state that there is no democracy in the
Punjab. We choose to call this a “monopolistic Mafia Raj”.
We suggest that a “competitiveMafia Raj” allows for a transition from “crimi-
nal broker”/“goon” to “criminal politician” (the dabang) and thus potentially to
greater levels of social mobility. By contrast, a “monopolistic Mafia Raj” gener-
ates less insecurity but is less amenable tonewcomers entering thepolitical fray
and rising up the political hierarchy. This is apparent from the fact that most
high-ranking politicians in the Punjab belong to very wealthy and upper-caste
families and that the Scheduled Castes, despite forming a larger percentage of
the population than any other group, have played only a marginal role in the
state’s politics. On the other hand, while up’s “competitiveMafia Raj” generates
considerable insecurity, it allows forceful political entrepreneurs who do not
belong to the traditional establishment to becomemlas andmps and to, there-
fore, destabilise established power structures and patron–client ties. Overall,
we hope to have shown that a grounded ethnographic description of pockets of
“mafia-owned democracies” can help to construct systematic comparisons of
different areas and generate a productive framework through which to refine
empirically the concept of “mafia-owned democracy” within South Asia and
beyond.
2017186 [AJSS-2017-45.6] 005-Martin-Michelutti-proof-01 [version 20170804 date 20170809 16:37] page 719
protection rackets and party machines 719
Asian Journal of Social Science 45 (2017) 692–722
References
Aidt,Toke,MiriamGoldenandDeveshTiwari (2015) “Criminality in theNational Indian
Legislature”. Working Paper. Unpublished Manuscript.
Arlacchi, Pino (1993) Men of dishonor. Inside the Sicilian Mafia. New York: William
Morrow.
Armao, Fabio (2015) “Mafia-Owned-Democracies. Italy andMexico as Patterns of Crim-
inal Neoliberalism”. Revista de Historia Actual 2(1): 4–21.
Banerjee, Abhijit and Rohini Pande (2007) “Parochial Politics: Ethnic Preferences and
Politician Corruption”. Working Paper rwp07–031. Cambridge: Kennedy School of
Government.Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=976548 (accessedon30Novem-
ber 2015).
Berenschot, Ward (2011) “On the Usefulness of Goondas in Indian Politics: ‘Money-
power’ and ‘Musclepower’ in a Gujarati Locality”. South Asia: Journal of South Asian
Studies 34(2): 255–275.
Berenschot, Ward (2014) “Muzaffarnagar Riots: Perils of a Patronage Democracy”. Eco-
nomic and PoliticalWeekly xlix(12): 15–18.
Blok, Anton (1972) “The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered”. Comp.
Stud. Soc. Hist. 14(04): 494–510.
Brass, Paul (1997) Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective
Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Breman, Jan (1974) Patronage and Exploitation: Changing Agrarian Relations in South
Gujarat, India. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.
Breman, Jan (2007)ThePovertyRegime inVillage India. Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press.
Briquet, Jean-Louis and Gilles Favarel-Garrigues (2010) Organized crime and states.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Chandra, Kanchan (2004) Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head-
counts in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chubb, James (1996) “The Mafia, the Market and the State in Italy and Russia”. Journal
of Modern Italian Studies 1(2): 273–291.
Chatterjee, P. (2004) The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most
of theWorld. New York: Columbia University Press.
Eckert, Julia (2003) The Charisma of Direct Action: Power, Politics and the Shiv Sena.
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Gambetta, Diego (1993) The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press.
Gayer, Laurent (2014) Karachi: Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City. NewYork:
Oxford University Press.
Gill, S.S. (2014) “Changing Economic Structure, Emergence of New Political Class and
Elections in Punjab”. Unpublished Manuscript.
2017186 [AJSS-2017-45.6] 005-Martin-Michelutti-proof-01 [version 20170804 date 20170809 16:37] page 720
720 martin and michelutti
Asian Journal of Social Science 45 (2017) 692–722
Gill, Sucha Singh (2013) “Gun Culture in Punjab”. Economic and Political Weekly 48(8):
16–18.
Gooptu, Nandini (2007) “Economic liberalisation, work and democracy: Industrial
Decline and Urban Politics in Kolkata”. Economic and Political Weekly 42(21): 1922–
1933.
Hansen, Thomas Blom (2001) Wages of Violence: Naming and Identity in Postcolonial
Bombay. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hansen, Thomas Blom (2005) “Sovereigns beyond the State: On Legality and Public
Authority in India”, in R. Kaur (ed.) Religion, Violence and Political Mobilisation in
South Asia. New Delhi: Sage, pp. 109–144.
Harriss-White, B. (2003) India working: Essays on society and economy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Harriss-White, B. (2010) “Globalization, the Financial Crisis and Petty Production in
India’s Socially Regulated Informal Economy”. Global Labour Journal, 1(1): 152–177.
Harriss-White, B. (ed.) (2015) Middle India and Urban-rural Development
add comma?
New Delhi
Springer India.
Hoffman, Kasper and Tom Kirk (2013) “Public Authority and the Provision of Public
Goods in Conflict-Affected and Transitioning Regions”. jsrp Paper 7. Available at:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a49e5274a27b200050f/JSRP7
-HoffmannKirk.pdf (accessed on 1 February 2017).
Jaffrelot, Christophe (2002) “Indian Democracy: The Rule of Law onTrial”. India Review
1(1): 77–121.
Jaffrelot, Christophe and Sanjay Kumar (eds.) (2009) Rise of the Plebeians? The Chang-
ing Face of the Indian Legislative Assemblies. Delhi: Routledge.
Jeffrey, Craig (2001) “A Fist Is StrongerThan Five Fingers: Caste andDominance in Rural
North India”. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 26(2): 217–236.
Jeffrey, Craig (2010) Timepass: Youth, class, and the politics of waiting in India. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Jeffrey, Roger, Craig Jeffery and Jens Lerche (eds.) (2014) Development Failure and
Identity Politics in Uttar Pradesh. New Delhi: Sage.
Jodhka, Surinder (2014) “What’s Happening to the Rural? Revisiting Marginalities and
Dominance in North-West India”, in Jonathan Parry and Nandini Gooptu (eds.)
Persistence of Poverty in India. Delhi: Social Science Press, pp. 317–343.
Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds.) (2007) Patrons, Clients, and Policies:
Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Manor, James (2007) “Changing State, Changing Society in India”. Journal of South
Asian Studies 25(2): 231–256.
Mbembe, Achille (1992) “The Banality of Power and the Aesthetics of Vulgarity in the
Postcolony”. Public Culture 4(2): 1–30.
2017186 [AJSS-2017-45.6] 005-Martin-Michelutti-proof-01 [version 20170804 date 20170809 16:37] page 721
protection rackets and party machines 721
Asian Journal of Social Science 45 (2017) 692–722
Migdal, John (1988) Strong Societies and Weak States. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Michelutti, Lucia (2008) TheVernacularisation of Democracy. Delhi and London: Rout-
ledge.
Michelutti, Lucia (2014a) “Circuits of Protections in Western Uttar Pradesh”. Working
Paper presented at Democratic CulturesWorkshop, Hyderabad, India, March 2014.
Michelutti, Lucia (2014b) “Kingship without kings”, in A. Piliavsky (ed.) Patronage as
Politics in South Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Michelutti, Lucia, Ashraf Hoque, Nicolas Martin, David Picherit, Paul Rollier, Arild
Ruud and Clarinda Still (nd.) “Mafia Raj: The Rule of Bosses in South Asia”. Unpub-
lished Manuscript, 2016.
Pai, Sudha (2007) “Political parties and Democracy: The bsp in Uttar Pradesh”, in
Ariving Sivaramakrishnan (ed.) Short of Democracy: Issues Facing Indian Political
Parties. New Delhi: Imprint One.
Paoli, Patrizia (2003)Mafia Brotherhoods: OrganizedCrime Italian Style. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Rafael, Vicente L. (ed.) (1999) Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Colonial Vietnam. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Raeymaekers, Timothy (2010) “Protection for sale? War and the transformation of
regulation on the Congo-Ugandan border”. Development and Change 41(4): 563–587.
Sanchez, Andrew (2015) Criminal Capital: Violence, Corruption and Making of Class in
an Indian Steel Town. Delhi: Routledge.
Santoro, Michele (2011) “Introduction. The Mafia and the Sociological imagination”.
Sociologica n. 2 (2011): 1–36.
Shah,Alpa (2006) “Markets of Protection:TheTerroristMaoistMovement and the State
in Jharkhand, India”. Critique of Anthropology 26(3): 297–314.
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy and P. Bourgois (2003) Violence in war and peace. New York:
Wiley-Blackwell.
Scott, James (1969) “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change”. The American
Political Science Review 63(4): 1142–1158.
Sidel, John (1999) Capital, coercion, and crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford:
University of California Press.
Singh, Gurharpal (1996) “Punjab since 1984: Disorder, Order and Legitimacy”. Asian
Survey 36(4): 410–421.
Singh, Pritam (2014) “Class, Nation and Religion: Changing Nature of Akali Dal Politics
in Punjab, India”. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 52(1): 55–77.
Strathern, Marilyn (2012) “Gifts Money Cannot Buy”. Social Anthropology 20(4): 397–
410.
Stokes, Susanne (2005) “Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics
with evidence from Argentina”. American Political Science Review 99(3): 315–325.
2017186 [AJSS-2017-45.6] 005-Martin-Michelutti-proof-01 [version 20170804 date 20170809 16:37] page 722
722 martin and michelutti
Asian Journal of Social Science 45 (2017) 692–722
Stokes, S., T. Dunning, M. Nazareno andV. Brusco (2013) Brokers, voters, and clientelism:
The puzzle of distributive politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tilly, Charles (1985) “War Making and State Making as Organised Crime”, in Peter
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.) Bringing the State Back In.
Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, pp. 169–191.
Vaishnav, Milan (2011) “The Market for Criminality: Money, Muscle and Elections
in India”. Available at: https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/sites/casi.sas.upenn.edu/files/iit/
Market%20for%20Criminality%20-%20Aug%202011.pdf (accessed on 30 Novem-
ber 2015).
Varese, Federico (2011) Organized Crime: Critical Concepts in Criminology. London:
Routledge.
Verniers, Gilles (2014) “The Root of the Goonda Raj: Why there is so much Violence
in Uttar Pradesh”. Scoll.in, 7 June. Available at: http://scroll.in/article/666450/The
-roots-of-Goonda-Raj:-Why-there%27s-so-much-violence-in-Uttar-Pradesh/
(accessed on 12 January 2015).
Vidal, Denis, Gilles Tarabout and Éric Meyer (eds.) (2003) Violence/Non-Violence: Some
Hindu Perspectives. Delhi: Manohar Publications.
Volkov, Vladimir (2002)Violent Entrepreneurs: TheUse of Force in theMaking of Russian
Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Weiner, Myron (1963) The politics of scarcity. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Wilkinson, Steven (2004) Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in
India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, I.D. (2015) The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post-New Order Indonesia: Coer-
cive Capital, Authority and Street Politics. London: Routledge.
Witsoe, Jeffrey (2009) “Territorial Democracy: Caste, Dominance andElectoral Practice
in Postcolonial India”. Political and Legal Anthropology Review 32(1): 64–83.
